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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the evolution of OECD imports over time and as a function of 
income levels, measuring the concentration of those imports across origin countries at 
the product level. We find evidence of diversification followed, in the very last years of 
the sample period (post-2000), by a slight reconcentration. This reconcentration is 
entirely explained by the growing importance of Chinese products in OECD imports. 
We also find evidence of relatively more volatile concentration levels for differentiated 
goods, consistent with a simple model of adverse selection and screening of suppliers 
by OECD buyers. Finally, we find that “accession” to OECD markets occurs directly 
(rather than after acquiring prior export experience on other markets) for more than 
half of the (extra-OECD) exporter/product pairs, but that one to eight years of 
experience enhances subsequent survival on OECD markets. Exports that reach OECD 
markets after more than eight years of experience elsewhere tend to survive less. 
 
Keywords: Import diversification, International trade, OECD,     
JEL classification codes: F1, O11 
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1. Introduction 
In spite of the rapid growth of emerging markets, OECD markets are still, today, 
the world’s largest, providing key outlets for goods exported from developing 
countries. How much access there is for developing countries on OECD markets 
has been the subject of considerable attention (see e.g. Kee, Nicita and 
Olarreaga 2006 and references therein). By contrast, to our knowledge, not 
much has been written on the overall evolution of OECD imports. Yet, it matters 
whether they are opening up (in the sense of letting more extra-OECD exporters 
in) or concentrating on a few “preferred” suppliers. Contestable OECD markets 
would make it easier for entrants to get a foothold; on the contrary, if they 
exhibited strong incumbency advantages, they could create a two-track world 
among extra-OECD exporters (between countries that make it and countries 
that don’t).  
 
So far, a rapidly expanding literature has looked at the other side of the story, 
namely how export diversification (geographical and product-wise) interacts 
with economic development. Renewed interest in export diversification per se is 
motivated by the observation that a country with diversified exports is less 
vulnerable to terms-of-trade shocks (Ghosh and Ostry 1994). Terms-of-trade 
volatility has been shown to reduce long-term growth by Lutz and Singer (1994) 
and Easterly and Kray (2000). For that and other reasons, diversification is 
correlated with growth, as discussed in the recent book by Lederman and 
Maloney (2007).  
 
Most of the literature has looked at product-wise diversification. Klinger and 
Lederman (2004) showed that the rate at which new products (defined at the 
HS4 or HS6 level) appear in a country’s export portfolio, and found that it varies 
with economic development and peaks at middle income levels. In a subsequent 
paper (Klinger and Lederman 2005) they found that regulatory barriers to entry 
encourage new-product introduction. Their evidence is consistent with the 
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hypothesis of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) whereby the private return to new-
product introduction is reduced by informational externalities. Hummels and 
Klenow (2005, henceforth HK) introduced a decomposition of cross-country 
export variation into intensive and extensive margins that has been widely used 
since.1 They showed that about 60% of the larger export volumes associated 
with country size is “explained” by the extensive margin. Cadot, Carrère and 
Strauss-Kahn (2007) showed that product diversification (measured by 
Herfindahl, Theil and Gini indices) evolves with income levels in a non-
monotone way, with diversification followed by reconcentration beyond income 
levels around $20’000 at PPP, a pattern similar to what Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003) found for production. Dutt, Mihov and van Zandt (2008) found no such 
non-monotonicity in Herfindahl indices calculated at a higher level of 
aggregation. Consistent with Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2005), they found 
that export diversification (instrumented) correlates with future income levels, 
and, moreover, that the similarity of a country’s export portfolio with that of the 
U.S. reinforces the effect on income levels.  
 
A second strand of the literature has looked at the extensive margin defined 
geographically instead of product-wise. The first paper in that vein was Evenett 
and Venables (2002), who showed, on the basis of evidence for a limited set of 
developing countries, that about one third of the export growth observed during 
their sample period came from the expansion of existing exports to new 
markets. They found that the product-wise extensive margin accounted for only 
a small fraction of within-country export growth.2 On the basis of a larger 
                                                   
 
1 In words, a country’s intensive margin is its market share in what it exports, whereas its 
extensive margin is the share of world trade accounted for by the goods in its export portfolio. 
Compared with simply counting the number of products a country exports, HK’s extensive 
margin takes into account the weight of those products in world trade. That is, by HK’s 
definition, a country that exports cars and computers will have a larger extensive margin than a 
country that exports carrots and potatoes, although both export just two goods. 
2 The seemingly inconsistent result of Evenett and Venables vs. HK come from the fact that the 
former considered within-country export growth whereas the latter looked at static cross-
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sample, Brenton and Newfarmer (2007) found that the extensive margin 
accounted for only 19.6% of export growth; of that, 18% came from the export of 
existing products to new markets. 
 
Another, time-honored strand of the trade literature, going back to the work of 
Hanson (1996), has emphasized the formation of regional production networks 
by multinational firms. According to this literature, a country’s exports may be 
determined by the outsourcing decisions of multinationals based in other 
countries. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that it is retailers who decide which 
foreign suppliers (and hence countries) are included in cross-border supply 
chains. Thus, for producers located in developing countries, export 
opportunities are, at least partly, driven by the policies of large buyers in OECD 
countries. If those buyers decide to concentrate on a few suppliers in order, say, 
to simplify logistics or quality-control processes, opportunities will be fewer for 
entrants at every level of productivity and trade costs. Put differently, given the 
continued importance of OECD markets for developing-country exports, it 
seems difficult to understand how developing-country exports evolve without 
looking at how OECD imports evolve. This is what we set out to do in this paper. 
 
Using a very large database of OECD imports at the SITC4 level since 1963, we 
find that, overall, OECD markets have been diversifying their sources of 
supplies (geographically) at the product level. This is reflected in decreasing 
concentration indices and a rising number of export sources. However, the 
trend in concentration has reversed itself in recent years. We show that this 
trend reversal is entirely explained by the rising share of Chinese products in 
OECD imports, as concentration indices decrease monotonically when China is 
excluded. We also find that the pattern of import diversification at the product 
level is broadly consistent with a simple model where buyers screen suppliers 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
country variation. Why results differ so much between the two approaches has not been 
explained so far in the literature.  
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for quality and toss them out when they under-perform. We test indirectly this 
conjecture by looking at how concentration indices vary across types of 
products. We find that they are more volatile, over time, for Rauch’s 
differentiated products (where quality can be expected to be more 
heterogeneous across suppliers than for homogenous or reference-priced 
products). We also find, as implied by the model, that re-concentration, when it 
happens, is associated with a rise in unit values. That is, when buyers re-
concentrate, they do so on higher-priced (and hence presumably higher-quality) 
suppliers. Finally, we show that a substantial chunk (more than half) of the new-
product exports from developing-country exports are shipped to OECD markets 
without prior experience in other markets. The evidence is again (loosely) 
consistent with a story in which these North-South relationships are set up as 
part of vertically integrated supply chains. However, we also find that one to 
eight years of prior export experience on non-OECD markets enhances 
subsequent survival on OECD markets.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a simple model of supplier 
screening in the presence of adverse selection. Section 3 analyses the overall 
trend in OECD import concentration. Section 4 explores more specifically the 
model’s implications for patterns of concentration and diversification. Section 5 
deals with export-expansion paths and “waiting times” before exports are 
shipped to OECD markets. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Supplier concentration and selection: Theory 
2.1 Baseline model 
In this section we explore how supplier concentration is affected by 
informational considerations in the presence of a selection problem. Consider a 
three-period setting where, in each period, a buyer needs to procure two units of 
a product from either one or two suppliers called X and Y. Each supplier has the 
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capacity to provide either one or two units, as the buyer wishes, at a constant 
price. Suppliers are of unknown quality, with a per-period probability of 
providing a non-defective product equal to Gλ  for a good type and B Gλ λ<  for a 
bad type (that is, the arrival of defective products follows an independent 
Bernoulli process for each supplier). The buyer knows Gλ  and Bλ  but not the 
type of each supplier, and assigns a prior probability 1p  on a good type. Let 
1pi  
be the buyer’s profit on a non-defective product and 0 1pi pi< on a defective one, 
payoffs being additive,3 and let 1iζ =  designate the event that the product is 
non-defective. Let  
 ( )1 01G G Gpi λ pi λ pi= + −        (1) 
and similarly for Bpi . In periods 2 and 3, the buyer revises his beliefs about the 
quality of each supplier on the basis of information (defective product or not) he 
obtained by dealing with them (if he did) in the previous period. Let  
 ( )11 1 , 2,31
i
i G t
t i i
G t B t
pp t
p p
λ
λ λ
−
− −
= =
+ −
      (2) 
be the revised probability that supplier i provides a non-defective product in 
period t, based on information from period t-1.  
 
The buyer faces two sequential-sampling (or stopping-time) problems on two 
independent stochastic processes, but the decisions are not independent 
because sampling on one has consequences for the optimal stopping time on the 
other. The problem is thus potentially very complicated, but the limitation to 
two suppliers and three periods keeps it tractable.4 Consider the third-period 
                                                   
 
3 At this stage we consider only informational considerations. We introduce a taste for diversity 
and competition considerations in section 2.2.  
4 The problem of selecting the stochastic process that delivers the highest expected reward 
among a set of independent processes is known in the statistical-decision literature as a “multi-
armed bandit” problem. One strategy, called “epsilon-first”, consists of a sampling (exploratory) 
phase during which several “levers” are tried, after which the experimenter sticks to the lever for 
which he has the most optimistic belief based on information gathered during the sampling 
phase. 
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problem, and let 3V be the buyer’s expected profit. Suppose that he dealt with 
both suppliers in period 2. Then in period 3 he buys both units from the best, so  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *3 3 32 2 1 2G BV p ppi pi= + −       (3) 
where  
 { }*3 3 3max ,x yp p p=         (4) 
is the highest of the two posteriors. If he used just one of them in period 2, i, 
then he just keeps that one and 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 3 31 2 1 2i G i BV p ppi pi= + −       (5) 
where ip3  is the revised belief on supplier i used in period 2. Clearly, by 
definition of the max, ( ) ( )3 32 1V V≥  and the expected difference, 
( ) ( )3 3 32 1V E V E V∆ = −       , is the value of information generated by keeping 
both suppliers in period 2. 
 
In period 2, with two suppliers and a discount factor δ , 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 3
2 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 .
x y G x y B
x y y x G B
V p p p p
p p p p V
pi pi
pi pi δ
= + − −
 + − + − + + 
   (6) 
With one supplier, 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )* *2 2 2 31 2 1 2 1G BV p p Vpi pi δ= + − +      (7) 
where { }*2 2 2max ,x yp p p= .  
 
In period 1, finally, the prior being the same on both suppliers, both are used, 
generating the information used to revise beliefs from 1p to 2
xp  and 2
yp  
respectively.   
 
Clearly, the “interim” payoff collected in period 2 is higher, in expected value, 
with one supplier than with two, since in the former case the buyer buys only 
from the best whereas in the latter he carries both along. However, the expected 
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period-3 payoff is, as noted, higher when two suppliers are kept in period 2 
because the information generated has a value. Thus, there is a trade off 
between concentrating on the most efficient supplier and keeping several in 
order to “test” them.  
 
What does the value of the information depend on? Suppose that, at the end of 
period 1, the buyer kept only one supplier, the one with the highest probability 
of being good, and suppose (without loss of generality) that it was supplier x. 
Letting 2I  stand for the information available at the beginning of period 2, the 
conditional expectation of the period-3 gain is (see appendix): 
 ( ) ( )3 2 2 22 1x G x BE V I p ppi pi = + −  .      (8) 
Let ( )3 3 2 2Pry y x y xp p p pφ = > <  be the probability that y would perform better than 
x if we could observe both in action in period 3. Using this, it can be shown that 
the value of the information is 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 3 3 2 3 2
2 2 2 2
;
2 .
y y x x
y y y x x G B
E V p p I E V I
E p p p p
φ
φ pi pi
 Ω = > −
 
 = > − −
 
     (9) 
Thus, the value of the information depends on three multiplicative terms. The 
first is the probability that a good draw for the second-best supplier would 
reverse the ranking of beliefs. In our three-period model, the event that 2 2
y xp p<  
implies that y had a defect in period 1 while x did not. Then, if fortunes are 
reversed in period 2 (x has a defect while y has not), it is easily verified that 
posteriors at the beginning of period 3 will be just equal for x and y. So, at best, 
the buyer will be indifferent between x and y in period 3. In (9), we have thus 
0yφ =  and, given the multiplicative form of Ω , the value of the information is 
nil: There is no reason to keep on sampling after period 1 and concentration has 
to take place. By contrast, in a 4-period framework, at the cost of tedious algebra 
it is (relatively) straightforward to show that a reversal of beliefs is possible with 
two successive lucky draws on y and two unlucky ones on x, and so, depending 
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on the parameters (λ  and pi ) continued sampling (using both suppliers) can be 
optimal in period 2. 
 
The second term is that in square brackets. Observe that it is decreasing in 2
xp ; 
the better is the “front-runner” supplier (x) the less there is to gain from an 
eventual reversal of beliefs. In our 3-period setting, this doesn’t say much, but in 
a multi-period setting it would have a potentially important consequence on 
which we will return. The third term, finally, is the difference in expected gains 
between a good and a bad supplier, which can be written as 
 ( ) ( )1 0G B G Bpi pi λ λ pi pi− = − − . (10) 
The first factor on the RHS of (10) is the difference between the prospects of a 
good and a bad supplier, a measure of their heterogeneity; the second is the 
effect of quality differences on profit, a measure of the industry’s characteristics 
(quality-sensitivity). Thus, the value of information, which in our setting drives 
the search for quality, is increasing in their heterogeneity and in the sensitivity 
of buyers to product quality. 
 
In order to get a better feel for what our simple model suggests empirically, we 
now turn to a few extensions of its baseline version. 
2.2 Extensions 
2.2.1 More than three periods 
With more periods, the revision of beliefs (i.e. the difference between posterior 
and prior from one period to the next) becomes smaller over time as beliefs 
approach asymptotically zero or one, but how fast the process of revision 
converges depends, of course, on the parameters of the two processes. If the two 
distributions (good and bad) have similar parameters, it takes, in expectation, 
more time to tell apart the two types, which requires longer sampling. illustrates 
how the rate of convergence varies with the parameters. In the LHS panel the 
two distributions are characterized by sharply different parameters and beliefs 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.09 
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converge after twenty periods; in the RHS panel, the two distributions have 
similar parameters and the beliefs take almost a hundred periods to converge.  
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.Figure 1. 
Random draws of Bernoulli processes in two cases 
A pair of draws with 0.8, 0.3G Bλ λ= =  A pair of draws with 0.6, 0.4G Bλ λ= =  
0
.
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t
delta px
py
 
-
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t
delta px
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Notes: The dotted blue curve gives 
x
tp , the revised probability that x is of the good type; the 
long-dashed red curve gives same thing for y, and the plain black curve gives the difference 
between the two. The same parameters are used to draw the observations and to update the 
beliefs (parameters are assumed common knowledge); x is of the good type and y of the bad 
type. 
 
In the LHS case, positions tend to lock in fairly quickly. In the RHS case, longer 
sampling is needed to tell apart the two suppliers; however, note that the 
difference in expected returns ( G Bpi pi− ), which is part of the value of the 
information, is also smaller, so the truth takes longer to appear but it matters 
less. Observe also that in the RHS panel, around iteration #20, supplier x has 
accumulated so many bad draws and supplier y so many good draws that the 
buyer is “almost certain” that y is of the good type, even though this belief is 
false (observe the dotted curve (y) approaching one between iterations #20 and 
#40). Going back to (9), we see that 
 ( )
2 2 2 2 2 21 1
lim lim 0x x y y x xp p E p p p p→ →Ω = > − = ; (11) 
that is, when the buyer becomes “almost certain” that his currently preferred 
supplier is of the good type, the value of information goes to zero and he stops 
sampling. If that were the case in the RHS panel of 
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.Figure 1 (where the preferred supplier around iteration 20 is y) the part of the 
red, long-dashed curve lying to the right of the stopping time would be 
censored. The remaining incumbent (here y) would then be the sole supplier 
until sufficient evidence accumulates to convince the buyer that he had bet on 
the wrong horse (in the figure, that becomes clear after about iteration 60 and 
the posterior on y finally converges to zero around iteration 90). The buyer 
would turn to an alternative supplier only when his revised opinion on the 
incumbent drops back below the evicted supplier’s last posterior.5 
2.2.2 New supplier entry 
So far we did not consider the entry of new suppliers. The number of suppliers 
would enlarge if trade costs were coming down or if productivity was rising 
exogenously among producers in a pool of potential suppliers with 
heterogeneous productivity levels as in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). 
Suppliers would then appear progressively, creating scope for diversification of 
supplier sources at the extensive margin. As before, the repetition of 
transactions with incumbents would asymptotically reveal their quality, but 
strings of bad draws would always be possible even for good types, and their 
replacement would then set the clock back to zero for the new ones. With 
several entrants all characterized by similar priors, buyers would start by 
sampling all of them like at the beginning of our 3-period model, subsequently 
                                                   
 
5 Note that in this setup there can be no “informational cascade”. An informational cascade 
(Bikhshandani et al. 1992) can take place when a sequence of actors make binary decisions on a 
singe issue (say, buying or selling a stock) based on a noisy signal about the correct decision and 
on the observed behaviour of past players. Each player forms his own belief based on a weighted 
average of his signal and past players’ actions, with weight on the latter that increases with the 
number of past players. Bikhshandani et al. show that there exists a critical number n such that, 
if n players observe the wrong signal and act accordingly, the n+1st will discard his own signal 
and follow the crowd. From then on, the herd behaviour cannot be reversed. Our setup is 
different for several reasons. First, the buyer is repeatedly getting information about his 
supplier, whereas in an informational cascade the individual experimenter gets only one signal 
that he compares with the actions of other (past) players. Second, the individual signal in an 
informational cascade is noisy, whereas it is not here. 
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concentrating on the best. Thus, episodes of diversification would be followed 
by episodes of concentration.  
 
Thus, informational considerations in the multi-period setup suggest that, in 
sectors where quality matters and is not standard across suppliers, entrants will 
find it hard to unseat incumbents as long as those perform well. But, with 
stochastic quality draws, incumbents are bound to fail one day or another. 
When they fail sufficiently severely (i.e. with a string of bad draws in a row), a 
window of opportunity opens up for entrants, ushering in a new phase of 
diversification, quality search, and ultimate re-concentration on the best 
performers.6 That is, diversification will happen by “bouts”, as a result of 
repeated failures in established buyer-supplier relationships, rather than as a 
continuous phenomenon.  
2.2.3 Taste for diversity 
A taste for diversity can be introduced in the model by replacing the assumption 
of additive payoffs (see footnote 4 supra) by a utility function of the form 
 ( ) 1/ii
αα
pi Π =
 ∑         (12) 
where { }0 1,ipi pi pi∈  is the profit made on the purchase from supplier i. To see 
what happens to the model’s basic predictions, consider period 3. The reasoning 
is similar for earlier periods. The period-3 payoff from using one supplier only 
(the preferred one), which was previously given by (3), is unchanged. That is, 
 ( ) ( )* *3 3 32,1 2 2 1G BV p ppi pi= + − .      (13) 
The corresponding payoff if the buyer uses both suppliers in period 3 is 
                                                   
 
6 Failure may also be triggered endogenously by moral hazard if incumbents slacken the 
monitoring effort as time passes. For a reputational model with both selection and moral 
hazard, see e.g. Laeven and Perotti (2007).  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1/
*
3 3 3 3
1/
*
3 3 3
2,2 2 1
1 2 1
y x G G B
y x G B B
V p p p
p p p
αα α
αα α
pi pi pi
pi pi pi
  
= + − +    
  + − + + −    
   (14) 
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the preferred supplier is x. Replacing 
*
3p  by 3
xp  in (3), it is easily verified that, for 1α = , keeping one supplier is 
optimal (this is the benchmark case without a taste for diversity). However, as 
α goes down, the sign of the inequality is eventually reversed and the taste for 
diversity comes to dominate the selection effect. This is illustrated in Figure 2 
where ( )3 2,1V and ( )3 2,2V are shown as functions of ( )1 / 1σ α= − , the elasticity 
of substitution between the two suppliers, for assumed parameter values. For 
values of σ  below 4.3, the taste for diversity dominates and keeping both 
suppliers is optimal; for values above 4.3, the selection effect dominates and 
keeping only one supplier is optimal. 
 
 Figure 2  
Period-3 profit from one vs. two suppliers, as a function of the elasticity of 
substitution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Simulated parameter values are pi1=100, pi0=50, λG=0.8, λB=0.1, p3x=0.8, p3y=0.1. 
 
What does this mean for our model? Essentially that the taste for diversity acts 
as a counterforce to the selection effect, generating situations where the 
Bayesian update of beliefs designates one supplier as preferable to others but 
the buyer nevertheless keeps several because he values diversity.  
14
0
16
0
18
0
20
0
22
0
24
0
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0
sigma
V21 V22
Re-concentration in period 3
No re-
concentration
( )3 2,2V
( )3 2,1V
14
0
16
0
18
0
20
0
22
0
24
0
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.09 
 
 16
2.2.4 Competition among suppliers 
Competition between suppliers affects the model in the same way the taste for 
diversity does. Formally, it can be introduced by assuming that when our buyer 
procures from two suppliers, they charge a duopoly price (presumably Bertrand 
since each of them is assumed to have the capacity to cover the buyer’s entire 
needs) whereas if he buys from one supplier only, that supplier charges a 
monopoly price.7 This can be easily accommodated by rewriting (12) as 
 
( ) 1/ with two suppliers
2 with only one
D
ii
M
i
αα
pi
pi
  Π =  

∑      (15) 
and D Mi ipi pi> . The algebra is the same as in the previous section but the 
( )3 2,2V curve of Figure 2 shifts up, moving the crossing point to the right. That 
is, the range of the model’s parameters where the buyer prefers keeping several 
suppliers in spite of their heterogeneity (as reflected in posterior beliefs) 
expands, because keeping several puts them in competition with each other. 
 
All in all, our simple model suggests essentially this: 
1. Diversification of import sources can be driven by three forces: (a) quality 
search in the presence of a selection problem; (b) an exogenous taste for 
diversity (extension 1), or (c) a desire to limit monopoly positions (extension 
2). 
2. When driven by quality search, diversification is only a temporary 
phenomenon, as the buyer will, at the end of each search phase, re-
concentrate on the best supplier. 
3. Incumbent suppliers’ established positions will periodically be unseated by 
strings of bad quality draws, which will trigger the onset of new search 
phases. 
                                                   
 
7 Closing the model would require, in addition, some ad-hoc limitation to contestability, like a 
switching cost, to make monopoly pricing sustainable. 
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Thus, whereas the competition and taste-for-diversity forces generate maximum 
diversification at all times (an essentially static prediction), quality search 
suggests alternating phases of diversification and re-concentration. The range of 
parameter values where these alternating phases take place depends on the 
counterforces, but their existence is implied only by the informational features 
of the model. Thus, volatility in concentration levels can be taken as a hallmark 
of informational phenomena.8 
 
We now turn to an empirical exploration of three related questions: (i) how the 
concentration of OECD imports has evolved over time; (ii) whether it displays a 
volatility suggestive of the kind of informational considerations outlined in the 
simple model above; (iii) what (if any) implications this all has for access to 
OECD markets for extra-OECD producers. 
3.   Measuring  geographical import concentration 
3.1   Indices and data 
As discussed in the introduction, we measure, product by product, the 
geographical concentration of imports across origin countries. Our measures are 
standard ones: Herfindahl and Theil.9 The Herfindahl index for good k, 
normalized to range between zero and one, is  
                                                   
 
8 However, supply shocks knocking out suppliers periodically could also create exogenous 
volatility at the extensive margin. This is to be kept in mind in the empirical exploration that 
follows, as baseline volatility is unlikely to be exactly zero. 
9 We decided not to use Gini coefficient because of the issues associated with this concentration 
index. The Gini coefficient is a numerical representation of the degree of concentration and 
represents the distance between the Lorentz curve and the 45◦ line (egalitarian distribution). 
There are two issues with Gini coefficients. First, they place more weight on changes in the 
middle part of the distribution. If a transfer occurs from a larger number of exporters to a 
smaller number of exporters, it has a greater effect on the Gini if these numbers of exporters are 
near the middle rather than at the extremes of the distribution. Second, if the Lorentz curves 
cross, it is impossible to summarize the distribution in a single statistic without introducing 
value judgements. While studying concentration of import across time these issue should be 
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where /i ik k ks x x=  is the share of origin country i in OECD imports of product k 
and kn is the total number of countries exporting good k (we will discuss in more 
detail below alternative definitions of the set of exporting countries).  
 
Theil’s entropy index (Theil 1972) is given by  
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These indices are dependent on the definition of kn , the number of “potential 
exporters”. Our baseline definition of the set of potential exporters is the 
simplest one: it is the set of all countries having exported good k to some 
destination in the world (not necessarily OECD countries) at least two years in a 
row over the sample period. We impose the requirement of two consecutive 
years of exports instead of just one in order to ensure that the exporter is a 
successful one (Besedes and Prusa 2006a, 2006b show that two years is the 
median duration of export spells; only one year might signal failure rather than 
the capacity to export). This definition has the advantage of being time- and 
importer-invariant (the latter matters for the part of our analysis where we 
disaggregate OECD imports by importing country). In order to explore action at 
the extensive margin, we also consider the simple number of exporters of good k 
to OECD countries.  
 
Our data is COMTRADE import data for OECD countries (either taken as a bloc 
or disaggregated by importer) at the product level. Our preferred product 
classification is SITC4. The alternative, HS6, is more disaggregated (with 4’990 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
relevant. Herfindahl and Theil indices are robust to these sensitivity issues [on this, see Sen 
(1997)]. 
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to 5’016 lines depending on the year against 1’158 to 1’300 for SITC4), but the 
sample period is longer with SITC4, which also underwent fewer revisions. In 
terms of country coverage, SITC4 data covers 210 countries between 1962 and 
2006 (44 years); HS6 coverage is nominally available starting 1988. Descriptive 
statistics for our sample are shown for our indices in Table 1 . 
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 Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
54030 144 53 12 253
All exporters
54030 57 35 1 223
Herfindahl 54030 0.19 0.13 0.03 1
Theil 54030 2.68 0.48 0.86 4.87
Extra-OECD exports only
53769 35 31 1 194
Herfindahl 53769 0.35 0.22 0.03 1
Theil 53769 3.05 0.60 0.13 5.30
OECD
kn
OECD
kn
kn
 
 
Note: All variables are defined at the product (SITC4) level. That is, the “number of countries 
with nonzero exports 2 consecutive years in the sample period” means the number of countries 
that exported a given product 2 consecutive years to somewhere in the world (i.e. the number of 
potential exporters of that product). 
 
3.2   Intensive and extensive margins: Prima-facie evidence 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of simple averages over all products of our two 
concentration indices (Herfindahl and Theil ) expressed as indices relative to 
the sample’s initial year. That is, for Herfindahl, Figure 3 shows  
 0100 /t tH H H=         (18) 
where t kt tkH H n=∑  is the simple average for year t of the Herfindahl indices 
calculated for all goods k imported at t. The calculation is the same for the Theil 
index. 
 
Panel a) shows concentration indices calculated using all OECD imports (i.e. 
imports from all partners, including intra-OECD ones). A strong diversification 
trend is shown by both indices until 1999 (Herfindahl ) and 2002 (Theil), after 
which both rise until 2006, the sample’s last year (by 8.6% for Herfindahl and 
1.5% for Theil). Panel b) shows concentration indices calculated using only 
extra-OECD partners (i.e. developing countries). Both Herfindahl and Theil 
indices decrease until 1990 (modestly for Theil, which goes down by about 10% 
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over the period) and then go up. Between 1999 and 2006, the Theil index rises 
by 7.4%, almost three times its coefficient of variation over the period 1963-99.  
Figure 3 
OECD import concentration, 1963-2006 
All imports Extra-OECD imports only 
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Note: base 100, 1963; simple averages of indices over all products. Data from COMTRADE 
 
The trend reversal is unmistakable as far as imports from non-OECD countries 
are concerned. However, it takes place quite late in the sample period. In order 
to verify whether it is statistically significant, and that it is not a pure 
composition effect between products (i.e. a sectoral shift away from widely-
procured products toward narrowly-procured ones), we now turn to regressions 
of concentration indices on time and its square using fixed (product) effects. 
Results are shown in Table 2 . Columns (1)-(2) show results with concentration 
indices (the dependent variable) calculated over all imports (including intra-
OECD) whereas columns (3)-(4) show results for extra-OECD imports only (a 
more interesting measure from a developmental perspective). 
 
The within estimator confirms the convex time trend, as both time and its 
square are significant with opposite signs.  
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 Table 2  
Regression results, OECD import concentration on time trend 
All imports Extra-OECD imports only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regressors: Herfindahl Theil Herfindahl Theil
time -0.002*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.023***
(-13.19) (-34.03) (-31.80) (-43.53)
timesq 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(1.616) (4.723) (23.17) (28.13)
Constant 0.218*** 2.913*** 0.425*** 3.330***
(202.6) (861.4) (221.1) (686.9)
Observations 54030 54030 53769 53769
Number of index 1301 1301 1301 1301
R-squared 0.571 0.671 0.510 0.570
turning point 2001 2001 1993 1997
Product FE yes yes yes yes
Notes: t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
As for the extensive margin, Figure 4 shows the evolution of simple and import-
weighted averages, across SITC4 lines, of the number of exporters to the OECD 
over the sample period. 
 
Figure 4 
Average number of exporters to OECD, 1963-2006 
All suppliers 
(a) Simple average (b) Import-weighted average 
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Note:  
a/ Simple averages of number of exporters to OECD at the product (SITC4) level. 
b/ Import-weighted averages (weights = shares of each SITC4 product in OECD imports in 
given year) 
 
The extensive margin as measured by the average number of source countries 
does not seem to show the same kind of trend reversal that we observed in the 
concentration indices, which pick up action at both the extensive and intensive 
margins. Simple averages of the average number of OECD suppliers by SITC4 
product category are rising monotonically over time. Import-weighted averages 
are leveling out after 2000, but this is not very surprising. The numbers on the 
vertical axis show that on a trade-weighted basis, the average number of 
suppliers per product was over 100. For many products, this is likely to exhaust 
the pool of potential exporters, so a leveling off is to be expected.  
 
Table 3 reports the results of pooled and fixed-effects regressions of the number 
of exporters to the OECD on time, its square, and a specific time trend for the 
post-2000 period.  
 
In the latter period, as expected from Figure 4, there is a decline in the rate of 
increase in the number of exporters to the OECD.  This is reflected by the 
negative coefficient on Post 2000.  This inflexion is however not strong enough 
to reverse the trend. The observed re-concentration of OECD imports thus 
seems to be entirely caused by action at the intensive margin. 
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Table 3 
Regression results, Number of countries exporting to OECD 
Time 0.662 0.593 0.583 0.543
(17.18)*** (12.71)*** (38.49)*** (29.66)***
Time, squared 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.009
(9.19)*** (8.52)*** (24.76)*** (20.79)***
Post 2000 -0.391 -0.228
(2.63)*** (3.91)***
Constant 15.103 15.481 16.560 16.777
(40.80)*** (38.99)*** (113.19)*** (107.19)***
Observations 53'770 53'770 53'770 53'770
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.54 0.55
Number of SITC4 1'301 1'301
Fixed (prod.) effects no no yes yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
 
Note: Dependent variable: Number of non-OECD exporters to OECD.  
The time variable is an index starting as 1963 = 1. The post-2000 variable is another index 
starting at 2000 = 1. The panel is unbalanced.  
 
In order to explore further what might be driving the apparent re-concentration 
of OECD imports, we now decompose OECD imports by importing country and 
construct a three-dimensional panel whose unit of observation (the basis for the 
calculation of our concentration indices) is a product imported by an OECD 
country in a year (a triplet importer × product × year). Looking at things this 
way allows us to look for another type of composition effects that would work as 
follows. Suppose that the OECD has two members, A and B, with B sourcing its 
imports of a given product more narrowly than A. A rise in B’s share of OECD 
imports will raise the OECD-wide import concentration index for that product 
through a pure composition effect, although in our previous regressions this 
would be a within-product rise in the concentration index. Regression results 
are shown in Table 4 . 
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 Table 4 
Regression results, OECD import concentration on time trend 
Herfindahl 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007
(115.74)*** (86.33)*** (140.45)*** (92.51)***
Time, squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(51.13)*** (27.11)*** (41.94)*** (3.42)***
Post 2000 0.005 0.008
(14.76)*** (39.35)***
Constant 0.807 0.802 0.798 0.789
(932.13)*** (859.28)***(1320.17)***(1216.18)***
Observations 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.13
Fixed effects a/ no no yes yes
 
Theil 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time -0.012 -0.009 -0.019 -0.015
(63.78)*** (41.27)*** (155.47)*** (100.10)***
Time, squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(7.94)*** (7.32)*** (35.37)*** (7.05)***
Post 2000 0.012 0.020
(19.11)*** (47.64)***
Constant 4.236 4.222 4.358 4.336
(2336.35)***(2160.58)***(3626.10)***(3363.56)***
Observations 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.18
Fixed effects a/ no no yes yes
 
 
Number of partners 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time 0.093 0.153 0.062 0.091
(31.30)*** (42.34)*** (40.07)*** (48.33)***
Time, squared 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.003
(46.90)*** (14.21)*** (129.70)*** (75.63)***
Post 2000 0.305 0.147
(29.10)*** (27.01)***
Constant 3.259 2.917 3.033 2.871
(111.72)*** (92.81)*** (196.73)*** (173.47)***
Observations 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.29 0.29
Fixed effects a/ no no yes yes
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a/ fixed effects by importer × product pair 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.09 
 
 26 
Several observations come out of Table 4 . First, the re-concentration apparent 
in the Herfindahl and Theil indices seems robust to the introduction of fixed 
effects by importer × product pair. The news comes from the extensive margin, 
where not only the square term on time preserves the mononicity of 
diversification but even the post-2000 time trend no longer indicates a trend 
inflexion in the very last years. The disappearance of the trend inflexion 
(apparent in Table 3 which included fixed effects by products but not by 
importing country because the unit of observation was all-OECD imports) 
suggests that the inflexion resulted from a composition effect between importers 
as described above. 
 
Thus, the observed reconcentration of Table 2 is robust to the decomposition of 
OECD imports by importing country. However, as Tables 3 and 4 show, it does 
not occur at the extensive margin, all of the action being at the intensive margin. 
3.3 Import concentration and income 
We now explore the relationship between import concentration and income 
levels. “Within” importers, income levels are of course highly correlated with 
time. However, the correlation is not perfect, and looking at income levels also 
adds information in the between-country dimension. Accordingly, Table 5 
reports both pooled and fixed-effect regression results for the relationship 
between the level of income of OECD importers and the concentration of their 
imports.  
 
Income squared has a positive coefficient in all concentration regressions and a 
negative one in the number-of-partners regression, and this is robust to the 
introduction of fixed effects by country × product pair. Thus, the convexity 
(concavity for number of products) appears not just in the between-importer 
dimension but also in the within. Estimated turning points are shown in Table 6 
and illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Table 5 
Import concentration and income levels 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income -1E-05 *** -2.10E-05 *** -2.75E-05 *** -5.08E-05 *** 3.24E-04 *** 8.44E-04 ***
(-54.31) (-91.81) (-77.26) (-111.8) (45.46) (152.4)
Income, squared 1E-10 *** 2.46E-10 *** 3.42E-10 *** 5.65E-10 *** -8E-10 *** -5.31E-09 ***
(32.50) (57.98) (45.57) (67.05) (-5.321) (-51.64)
Constant 7.42E-01 *** 9.26E-01 *** 4.33E+00 *** 4.74E+00 *** 2.24E+00 *** -7.14E+00 ***
(353.9) (319.1) (1068) (822.7) (27.58) (-101.6)
Observations 735'000 735'000 735'000 735'000 735'000 735'000
R-squared 0.061 0.096 0.046 0.134 0.086 0.227
# groups 0.015 0.036 0.030 0.059 0.040 0.213
Fixed effects no yes no yes no yes
TheilHerfindahl # non-OECD partners 
 
Notes 
a/ Fixed effects by importer × product pair. 
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Table 6 
Estimated turning points, 2005 PPP dollars  
Pooled Within
Herfindahl index 39'679 42'703
Theil index 40'250 44'958
# suppliers n.a. n.a.
 
 
Figure 5 
Predicted concentration indices (pooled) 
Herfindahl Theil 
  
 
Obviously the turning point is very high in terms of income, leaving only 
Norway since 1997 and the US since 2004 to the right of it. 
3.4   The China effect 
Considering the rising importance of OECD trade with China over the last 
decade, we must control for the role that China may play in that 
reconcentration. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the Theil index for extra-OECD 
imports, both with and without China.  The figures show that China is indeed 
driving the observed reconcentration. Further evidence is provided in Table 7, 
which shows that the coefficient on time squared loses its significance when 
China is excluded from the sample.  
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 Figure 6 
Theil index for OECD imports excluding China, 1963-2006 
Extra-OECD imports     Extra-OECD imports excluding China 
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Table 7 
Regression results, OECD import concentration on time trend, excluding China 
Regressors: Herfindahl Theil
time -0.004*** -0.013***
(-17.08) (-24.61)
timesq 0.000* 0.000
(1.925) (0.0720)
Constant 0.419*** 3.302***
(218.4) (677.4)
Observations 53763 53763
R-squared 0.531 0.581
Product FE yes yes
Notes: t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
 Figure 7 confirms that the increased concentration of OECD imports on China 
occurs at the intensive margin: In recent years, no new product line opened 
between China and its OECD trade partners.  
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 Figure 7 
Contribution of the intensive and extensive margin to  
China-OECD imports growth, 1963-2006 
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Thus, although OECD imports are increasingly concentrating on Chinese 
products, evidence from section 3 shows that OECD countries continue to open 
new imports lines with extra-OECD countries. Put differently, China’s 
expanding exports to the OECD do not seem (yet) to crowd out the entry of new 
exporter/product pairs on OECD markets.   
 
The evidence in this section shows diversification taking place over time and as 
a function of income levels, subject to two caveats: (i) China’s growing share of 
OECD imports, which caused a recent re-concentration, and (ii) an ultimate 
reversal (i.e. a re-concentration) at the intensive margin at very high levels of 
income. However, the evidence so far does not say what drives this progressive 
diversification, nor what counter-forces, if any, may be at play, preventing it 
from being instantaneous. That is, prima-facie evidence does not tell us when 
the doors of OECD markets open and when they close. In order to deal with this 
question, we now explore empirically the implications of the quality-search 
model of section 2. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.09 
 
 
 
31 
4. Concentration and quality search: The evidence 
Quality screening of suppliers can be expected to be more important for 
products whose quality matters and where it is not standardized across 
suppliers. We attempt here to identify this type of effect by exploring how 
product type correlates with the concentration of supply sources using Rauch’s 
classification of goods into homogenous, reference-priced, and differentiated. 
Rauch’s classification has the advantage of being, in principle, orthogonal to 
economies of scale, as it characterizes goods rather than their production 
process (although the two may be related). Regression results are shown in 
Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
Regression results, concentration and product differentiation 
Herfindahl Theil # partners
(1) (2) (3)
Time -0.006 -0.011 -0.002
(19.17)*** (16.36)*** (0.15)
Time^2 0.000 0.000 0.004
(5.52)*** (1.30) (17.22)***
Reference price -0.023 0.013 0.188
(10.58)*** (2.85)*** (2.39)**
Differentiated -0.138 -0.204 5.151
(64.69)*** (45.50)*** (66.65)***
Importer GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000
(5.12)*** (2.60)*** (13.49)***
Constant 0.898 4.742 -1.357
(97.80)*** (245.33)***(4.07)***
Observations 99'638 99'638 99'638
R-squared 0.15 0.19 0.21
Importer FE yes yes yes
 
 
 
Compared to homogenous goods (the omitted category), differentiated goods 
are characterized by significantly lower geographical concentration, although 
the effect is quantitatively small.  
 
The model of section 2 also suggested that, for products subject to supplier 
screening, diversification should take place by “bouts”, followed by re-
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concentration as buyers and suppliers establish relationships based on 
accumulated quality records. Thus, there should be more variability in the 
degree of concentration for those goods. Accordingly, we report in Table 9 
regression results of the standard deviation of concentration indices “within 
products” (i.e. calculated over the entire sample period for each product) on 
Rauch’s index of production differentiation. Note that, in so doing, we reduce 
the sample’s dimensionality from three (importer × product × time) to two 
(importer × product). We estimate the regressions with importer fixed effects. 
 
Table 9 
Regression results, volatility of concentration on product differentiation 
σ_herf σ_theil σ_nber
(1) (2) (3)
Reference price 0.010 0.034 0.741
(2.89)*** (4.90)*** (6.56)***
Differentiated 0.025 0.100 3.264
(7.57)*** (15.39)*** (20.02)***
Constant 0.160 0.290 0.741
(20.58)*** (20.80)*** (4.21)***
Observations 3'122 3'122 3'122
R-squared 0.07 0.13 0.24
Importer FE yes yes yes
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variable: standard deviation of 
concentration index (Herfindahl, Theil or number of suppliers); sample is a cross section of 
SITC4 products (not all SITC4 goods are coded in Rauch’s database, hence the relatively small 
number of observations). Results reported use Rauch’s “liberal” classification; using his 
“conservative” classification yields almost identical results. 
 
Results are as suggested by the model. The volatility of concentration indices is 
higher for differentiated products, and the difference between categories is very 
large. For instance, the standard deviation of the number of suppliers is, on 
average, 2.35 for homogenous goods. For differentiated goods, ceteris paribus, it 
rises to 5.61 (2.35 + 3.26), a 138% increase. This indeed suggests alternating 
periods of diversification and concentration.  
 
The model also suggests that at the end of quality-search phases, concentration 
should take place on the best-performing suppliers. This is a hypothesis that is 
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difficult to verify, as quality is largely unobserved, but the following exercise 
provides a rough indication about it. For each good and year, we calculate an 
import-weighted average of unit values. If re-concentration, when it takes place, 
is on the best performers, year-on-year changes in the Theil index should be 
correlated with changes in the average unit value (that is, when concentration 
rises, the average unit value rises as well, through a composition effect, because 
high-quality suppliers are given a higher share). Results of a regression of first 
differences in Theil indices on first differences in weighted-average unit values 
are shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 
Regression results, change in Theil on change in unit values 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var. ∆ Theil ∆ Theil ∆ Theil ∆ Theil ∆ Theil
Regressors
∆ UV 4.50e-07* 4.88e-07** 4.79e-07** 4.44e-07* 4.80e-07**
(2.47e-07) (2.41e-07) (2.41e-07) (2.46e-07) (2.41e-07)
Constant -0.0107*** -0.0107*** -0.0138*** -0.00623*** -0.0133***
(0.000268) (0.000265) (0.00262) (0.00185) (0.00187)
Observations 1'059'984 1'059'984 1'059'984 1'059'984 1'059'984
Number of index 36'016 36'016 36'016 36'016
R-squared 0.000 . 0.003 0.002 .
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Column 1 uses fixed effects (by product × importer); 
column 2 uses random effects; column 3 uses dummies by year, product and importer, and 
columns 4 and 5 are like 1 and 2 but with time dummies. 
 
It can be seen that positive year-on-year changes in the Theil index are, by and 
large, associated with positive changes in unit values, providing further support 
to the model’s basic prediction. A similar regression performed using the 
exporter’s GDP per capita instead of unit values gives a qualitatively similar 
result, suggesting that when re-concentration takes place, it is on suppliers 
located in higher-income countries. The evidence in Table 10 is suggestive of a 
quality-search process rather than a price-search one (where the price-search 
phase would settle on the lowest-price supplier). 
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5.   Getting to OECD markets 
For most if not all export products, OECD markets are the largest. Even if, on 
aggregate, they are not necessarily the fastest growing, at the level of the firm 
they typically offer the largest expansion potential. However they are also often 
difficult in the sense of requiring product and service quality standards that not 
all firms and countries can offer. Whether export promotion strategies should 
target those markets directly, or whether they should proceed in steps, using 
regional LDC markets as stepping stones for exporters, is a recurrent debate 
among policy makers in developing countries. We explore in this section what 
the aggregate evidence has to say, i.e. whether the norm among non-OECD 
exporters is to try OECD markets first or whether those are reached only after 
exporting experience has been accumulated on non-OECD markets. 
5.1   Prima-facie evidence 
We use again bilateral trade data at the SITC4 level. Our unit of observation is 
the first year of a bilateral export spell of an SITC4 product, i.e. a vector ijktx  = 
[exporting country i, importing country j, product k, initial year t]. For each 
non-OECD exporter and product, using mirrored data10 we isolate (i) the first 
year of export to any destination in the world, and (ii) the first year of export to 
any OECD country. A “new export” is a product that is exported for the first time 
in the sample period (not an export spell starting after a temporary trade 
interruption). Thus, a spell starting in 1964 after zero values in 1962-63 is a new 
export; but a spell starting in 1966 after a 1962-63 spell interrupted in 1964-65 
                                                   
 
10 “Mirroring” consists of using the importing country is the reporter and the exporting one as 
the partner. This improves the reliability of trade data as national customs administrations (the 
ultimate source of COMTRADE data) usually monitor imports more closely than exports. 
Mirroring can however lead to distortions in the presence of smuggling or under-reporting. In 
order to circumscribe the problem, CEPII reconciles import and export data on a case-by-case 
basis in the BACI database. We stick to COMTRADE data here because BACI does not cover 
enough years; in addition, for many exercises in this paper our reporter countries are OECD 
countries whose data is usually reliable.  
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is not. We treat left-censoring at the sample period’s initial year (1962) by 
excluding from new exports the spells starting in 1962 or 1963. 11  The number of 
years between the first year of export to the world and to OECD countries is the 
“waiting time” during which a country exports the product in question before 
shipping it to OECD markets. If it is zero, exports go directly to the OECD. In 
assessing the frequency of instances of “OECD-first”, “OECD after one year” and 
so on, the unit of observation is a country-year pair. However multiple 
observations will appear in the database when a country starts exporting a 
product to several non-OECD destinations simultaneously, or when it starts to 
export it to several OECD destinations. In order to avoid double counting, we 
collapse those multiple-destination occurrences into single observations. That 
is, if in 1990 Ghana exports mil for the first time and does so simultaneously to 
Burkina Faso and Mali, we count [Ghana, . , mil, 1990]  as a single observation 
where the dot stands for the export destination (Burkina Faso and Mali in this 
case).  
 
Overall, 76% of non-OECD new exports reach the OECD markets at some point 
in time. Among these exports that are eventually shipped to the OECD, more 
than half (58.5%) are first-export instances (i.e., the first year of export to the 
world and to OECD countries is the same). Figure 8 depicts the frequency of the 
“waiting time” for the sub-sample of non-OECD countries engaged in trade with 
the OECD.  When first-export instances are to non-OECD countries, the 
proportion of observations with one year before the first export to an OECD 
market is 3.5% after which it decreases exponentially as a function of the 
waiting time.  
                                                   
 
11 We tested for alternative assumptions (i.e., 3 and 4 years of no trade prior to first appearance 
in the database). Results are similar to the ones presented here and are available upon request.   
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 Figure 8  
Frequency of the waiting time 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 9, the percentage of new exports that go directly to the 
OECD is remarkably similar across regions and levels of income. 
 
 Figure 9 
Percentage of OECD-first instances 
(a) By region (b) By level of income 
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Notes: SA: South Asia; Eur. & CA: Europe and Central Asia; MENA: Middle East and North 
Africa; EAP: East Asia and Pacific; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa; LAC: Latin America and 
Carribeans. Vertical axis measures the percentage of (exporter, year, product) observations that 
are exported first to one or several OECD markets. 
 
Interestingly, the percentage is slightly higher for low-income countries (63.1%) 
although policy-makers and business leaders in these countries are often 
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intimidated by the suggestion of trying OECD markets directly. For sub-Saharan 
African exporters, the percentage (66.7%) is higher than any other region. This 
may reflect a scenario where European buyers directly approach and train 
African producers to fill specific niches in the value chain under the benefit of 
preferential trade regimes.12  
 
In order to verify if tariff preferences have anything to do with the decision to 
shoot directly for OECD markets, we restricted the sample to SSA exporters and 
ran a probit of a binary variable equal to one when the first export is to E.U. 
markets on the E.U.’s MFN tariffs, which approximate the tariff preference 
margins available to SSA producers under the EPA/EBA regimes. Results are 
shown in  Table 11. 
 
 Table 11  
Incidence of “EU-first” exports of SSA products and tariff preference margins: 
probit marginal effects 
(3) (4)
EU MFN tariff 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
(5.80)*** (5.13)*** (4.27)*** (4.08)***
Upper middle income -0.242 -0.251
(8.08)*** (8.41)***
Lower middle income -0.025 -0.014 -0.501 0.039
(0.97) (0.55) (5.81)*** (0.64)
Low income -0.048 -0.036 -0.219 0.002
(1.99)** (1.57) (4.30)*** (0.03)
Sector controls no yes no yes
Exporter controls no no yes yes
Observations 19'328 19'328 19'200 19'192
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.1332 0.2206 0.3186
(1) (2)
 
Notes: Dependent variable: probability of a direct export to OECD markets; probit marginal 
effects ; for dummy variables (exporter income levels) give effect of changing the level from zero 
to one on the dependent variable; z-statistics in parentheses.  
  
                                                   
 
12 Preferential regimes available to SSA exporters on EU markets include the EBA (Everything 
But Arms) initiative, which gives tariff-free access for exports from LDCs except in “special-
regime” sectors like sugar, beef, dairy, or bananas, and the EPAs (Economic Partnership 
Agreements) which replace the Cotonou Convention regime for those countries in SSA that have 
signed these agreements (for others, the legal regime of exports is presently uncertain). 
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The first column reports pooled probit regression results, the second with broad 
sector controls at the SITC1 level (9 sectors), the third with exporter controls, 
and the fourth with sector and exporter controls. In all cases, the partial 
correlation of E.U. MFN tariffs (and hence preferential margins) with the 
probability of a direct export to the E.U. is positive, giving support to the 
conjecture above, although the effect is very small (the marginal effects reported 
in  Table 11 show that a one percentage point rise in the preference margin 
raises the probability of a first export to E.U. markets by only 0.004). The 
probit, by construction, does not allow for negative values. The negative signs on 
dummies’ coefficients are curves shifter and should not be interpreted literally.  
We may however compare the coefficient across income groups. As we are 
considering the sub-sample of sub-Saharan African countries, it does not 
include high-income countries. The three included dummies exhaust the sample 
and the constant is omitted. Compared to upper middle income countries, lower 
income countries have higher probability of assessing the EU market at first 
incidence. This may reflect the fact that the least developed countries are the 
one having greater access to preferential trade regimes. 
5.2 Export-expansion paths and contracts 
The regressions reported above included only coarse sectoral dummies that do 
not tell us much on the relationship between the good exported and the decision 
to export to OECD markets first. Antras (2003) showed that vertical integration 
between final-good producers and their suppliers is more efficient than 
outsourcing as a device to overcome moral hazard in a context of incomplete 
contracts in capital-intensive industries. The reasoning, roughly, goes as 
follows. Consider a North-South relationship between the Northern buyer and 
the Southern supplier of an intermediate good. Assume that there is moral 
hazard in the provision of the intermediate good (quality is not contractible) and 
that cost-sharing is feasible for capital investments but not for labor 
investments, because buyers cannot effectively meddle with labor management 
in a foreign, developing country. With incomplete contracts, moral hazard will 
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lead to under-investment in both labor and capital. Compared to outsourcing, 
vertical integration will alleviate the moral-hazard problem (although not 
entirely), but will also weaken the bargaining position of the Southern 
subsidiary, making it unwilling to hire as much as would be jointly optimal. In 
Antras’ model, headquarters in the North cannot “command” the optimal level 
of hiring and so must live with this sub-optimal outcome. If the industry is 
capital intensive, Antras shows that the ensuing distortion is less costly than if it 
is labor intensive. Econometric evidence motivating the theory shows that intra-
firm trade is more prevalent in capital-intensive industries. The relevance for 
our investigation of trade patterns is this: when Northern firms set up 
subsidiaries in Southern countries, those subsidiaries are likely to engage in 
direct trade relationships with the Northern parent company. This will show in 
our data as a higher incidence of direct exports to OECD. If this reasoning is 
correct, we should observe a correlation, at the product level, between capital-
intensiveness and the probability of a direct export.  
 
Antras uses a direct measure of capital intensiveness (the stock of capital per 
employee), but such measures are typically available only at the level of broad 
sectors in UNIDO and other databases. We take a different approach here and 
use indices of revealed factor intensity calculated at the SITC4 level in Cadot, 
Shihotori and Tumurchudur (2008). Briefly, the method used to calculate those 
indices goes as follows. Step one consisted in constructing a systematic database 
of country endowments (capital per head, human capital per head, and land per 
head) updating Easterly and Levine (2000) for capital and Barro and Lee (1993) 
for human capital. Step two consisted in calculating revealed comparative 
advantage indices for each product and country at the SITC4 level. Step three 
consisted in calculating revealed factor intensity indices for each SITC4 good as 
follows: Index goods by k and countries by i, let ( ) ( )/ /ik ik i kX X X Xω =  be 
country i’s revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index for good k, and let iκ be 
country i’s capital endowment (stock of capital per head). Good k’s revealed 
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capital intensity is calculated as a weighted average of the capital endowment of 
exporters of good k, each of them weighted by its RCA in good k: 
 ik ikiκ ω κ=∑ .        (19) 
Good k’s revealed intensity in human capital is similarly calculated as  
 ik ikih hω=∑          (20) 
The relationship between the probability of a direct export and the exported 
product’s factor intensity is shown in Table 12. The dependent variable is, as in  
Table 11, a dummy variable marking first-export instances where the product 
(defined at the SITC4 level) is shipped to an OECD country, and we run a probit 
of that variable on characteristics of the good (revealed factor intensity indices) 
and the exporting country (level of income).  
 
 Table 12 
Incidence of « OECD-first » exports and factor intensities: Probit marginal 
effects 
(1) (2) (3)
HK intensity 0.036 0.040 0.037
(10.10)*** (11.26)*** (12.50)***
Capital intensity 0.000 0.000 0.000
(9.51)*** (9.17)*** (8.28)***
Land intensity -0.246 -0.244 -0.171
(14.97)*** (14.86)*** (12.63)***
Upper middle income -0.136
(5.77)***
Lower middle income 0.067
(3.49)***
Low income 0.056
(2.74)***
Exporter controls no no yes
Observations 19'758 19'758 19'758
Pseudo-R2 0.1046 0.1315 0.3313
 
Notes: Dependent variable: probability of a direct export to OECD markets; probit marginal 
effects. 
 
The results are consistent with the vertical-integration conjecture. OECD-first 
instances are positively correlated with the capital intensity of the product 
exported, and the correlation is significant at 1%. The positive correlation with 
the human-capital intensity tells a similar story: in a vertically integrated 
relationship where the Northern parent company can share training costs 
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(which is plausible) but not labor management, moral hazard will distort, as 
before, the Southern subsidiary’s hiring decision but not so much the Northern 
parent’s training/skilled hiring decision. This will be less of a problem for skill-
intensive goods. Thus, Southern skill-intensive exports are more likely to be 
intra-firm trade in intermediates and therefore to go directly to OECD markets 
for further processing.13 14 
5.3 Export-expansion paths and survival 
As a last exercise, we explore whether getting to OECD markets in steps (first 
gaining experience on extra-OECD markets) improves subsequent survival on 
OECD markets. Figure 11 plots the average number of years of active export on 
OECD markets (distinct from the average length of export spells, which is much 
shorter) against the waiting time (between the first export to any destination 
and the first export to the OECD), by exporter × product. Primary evidences 
show two important results. First, short periods of “waiting time” correlate with 
longer survival.  Second, further “waiting” reduces drastically the likelihood of 
survival in OECD markets.  As can be seen in Figure 10, gaining experience by 
exporting to non-OECD countries for one year prior to accessing OECD markets 
increases the survival of exporting to OECD countries. Longer “waiting times”, 
up to 8 years for middle income countries, might still be beneficial. Waiting 
“too” much in non-OECD markets reduces however the chance of success in 
OECD markets (this is true for waiting time above one year for the less 
developed countries). 
                                                   
 
13 Intermediates may also be shipped to other, non-OECD countries for further processing; thus, 
some of the extra-OECD exports to other extra-OECD markets can also be intra-firm trade 
controlled by multinationals headquartered in OECD. 
14 The interpretation of the coefficients on countries income group dummies follows the same 
vein as for Table 10. 
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 Figure 10  
Years of active exports with OECD as a function of waiting time  
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Figure 11 shows the same information arranged by region. Results are similar. 
For all regions (except SSA), a short experience correlates with longer survival. 
The positive effect of waiting before entering the OECD market picks at one year 
of experience and fades away after five to nine years depending on the regions.15 
Longer waiting times are correlated with lower chance of surviving on OECD 
markets. This latter result might reflect a selection bias with the less-efficient/ 
worth-quality producers taking their chance on OECD markets only after long 
periods. 
 
Thus, prima facie evidence is suggestive of two important findings which would 
merit further analysis: a benefit of acquiring export experience on extra-OECD 
markets for short periods (one year seems to be the optimum), and a risk of 
waiting too long thereby reducing success of survival on OECD markets.  
                                                   
 
15 SSA increases its survival on OECD market only if it gathered experience for one year. 
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 Figure 11  
Years of active exports with OECD as a function of waiting time  
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Notes: SA: South Asia; Eur. & CA: Europe and Central Asia; MENA: Middle East and North 
Africa; EAP: East Asia and Pacific; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa; LAC: Latin America and 
Carribeans.  
 
6.   Concluding remarks 
Looking at the evolution of OECD imports, at a high degree of disaggregation 
(over a thousand product lines) on a forty-year period where data is available, 
we found striking evidence of geographical diversification at the product level. 
That is, OECD countries have been sourcing each good from increasingly large 
pools of suppliers. We also found evidence of re-concentration of imports in the 
last five years or so, but this trend reversal is attributable to the growing share of 
China in OECD imports. Put together with Besedes and Prusa’s (2006a, 2006b) 
findings of high churning rates among exporters, our findings suggest that 
OECD markets are increasingly contestable for developing-country exporters.  
 
As for the drivers of diversification vs. re-concentration, we find that 
geographical concentration is higher but also more volatile for differentiated 
goods where quality presumably matters more and is more heterogeneous 
across suppliers. Moreover, when re-concentration takes place, it tends to be on 
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higher-priced national varieties. Put together, these observations lend support 
to a model of quality search by OECD buyers, discussed in section 2 of this 
paper, which generates alternating periods of concentration and diversification. 
This means that the contestability of OECD markets varies across time and 
products, with closed-door periods (characterized by strong incumbency 
advantages) alternating with open-door periods (characterized by 
contestability). In terms or policy implications, our results highlight the 
importance of raising exporter quality-management capacities in developing 
countries, as periods of open doors appear to be essentially periods of quality 
search. 
 
Finally, we find that about 60% of extra-OECD suppliers ship their goods for the 
first time directly to OECD markets. We find evidence supportive of the view 
that OECD-first exports are contractual relationships driven by Northern 
buyers. While a short period (one to eight years) of prior export experience 
gathered on non-OECD markets enhances subsequent survival on OECD 
markets, further waiting is associated with a lower likelihood of survival on 
these markets. Products designed for non-OECD markets are, probably, less 
suited to OECD buyers than those that were designed according to 
specifications by OECD buyers, reinforcing our argument about their role in 
developing-country export expansion.  
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Appendix 
The expression for the expected period-3 gain, as of the beginning of period 2, 
given that the buyer kept only one supplier, x, is  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 2 2 3 2 2 3 21 1 0x x x xE V I q E V q E Vζ ζ= = + − =     (21) 
where the probability of no defect in period 3 given information in period 2, 2
xq , 
is 
 ( ) ( )2 3 2 2 2Pr 1 1x x x G x Bq I p pζ λ λ≡ = = + − ,     (22) 
and the expected gain in period 3 is 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )3 2 3 2 3 21 1 2 1 1 2x x x G x x BE V p pζ ζ pi ζ pi = = = + − =     (23) 
given no defect in period 2 and  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )3 2 3 2 3 20 0 2 1 0 2x x x G x x BE V p pζ ζ pi ζ pi = = = + − =    (24) 
given a defect in period 2. Finally, the probability of supplier x being of the good 
type is, by Bayes’ rule, 
 ( ) ( ) ( )23 2 2 2 21 Pr 1 1
G x
x x x
G x B x
pp G
p p
λζ ζ
λ λ
= = = =
+ −
    (25) 
given no defect in period 2 and  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
2
3 2 2
2 2
1
0 Pr 0
1 1 1
G x
x x x
G x B x
p
p G
p p
λζ ζ
λ λ
−
= = = =
− + − −
  (26) 
given a defect. Substituting these expressions into (21) and simplifying gives 
expression (8) in the text. 
